Netherlands: A group of tobacco retailers is lobbying to influence national and European policies

The Collectief Tabak Speciaalzaken (CTS, or in English, the "Collectif des magasins spécialistes dans le tabac") is an organization created in the Netherlands in February 2026 to represent the interests of retailers specializing in the sale of tobacco, at the national and European levels.[1]. The group states its intention to strengthen the representation of independent tobacco retailers with political leaders, public decision-makers, and the media. The group asserts that regulatory changes have a significant impact on its sector and wishes to participate more actively in discussions regarding tobacco control policies. However, its representatives regret not being received by Dutch authorities, particularly in light of the rules stemming from the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), which govern interactions between public authorities and the tobacco industry, and specifically Article 5.3.

The use of third parties by the tobacco industry, including at European level

The creation of the CTS comes at a time when tobacco retailers already have trade organizations, notably NSO Retail, which represents tobacco and convenience stores in the Netherlands. Previous work has documented the relationship between this organization and the tobacco industry, particularly in the context of debates on excise tax increases and restrictions on points of sale. Journalistic research has also described strategies for involving retail representatives in public debates, where they can appear as independent economic actors rather than direct representatives of manufacturers. The existence of such practices is consistent with a broader, internationally documented strategy: the tobacco industry uses trade organizations, retailers' associations, front groups, or other third parties to covertly advocate for its interests with policymakers. The mobilization of third parties aims to lend credibility to the industry's positions and to use these third parties to lobby policymakers and influence decisions in its favor. Such a strategy has been particularly documented in France with the use of the Confederation of tobacconists by tobacco manufacturers.

In the case of the CTS, the available information does not establish that the group is directly funded or linked to tobacco manufacturers.

Beyond this, one of the most significant aspects of the CTS's development lies in its desire to act at the European level. The collective has joined the European Confederation of Tobacco Retailers (ECTR), an organization presented as a representative of European tobacco retailers. This affiliation is important in light of the ECTR's history. Academic research, based in particular on internal Philip Morris International (PMI) documents, has shown that the organization was mobilized in the 2010s as part of the manufacturer's lobbying strategy against the revision of the European Tobacco Products Directive (TPD). The documents studied by researchers show that PMI considered the use of third-party organizations as an important element of its influence strategy. Lobbying watchdog organizations have also documented Philip Morris's expenditures related to the ECTR and the involvement of a British public relations firm working with this organization.

These elements are historical and do not demonstrate that PMI funding currently exists between the manufacturer and the CTS. They do, however, allow us to place the choice of the ECDT within a broader context of European lobbying and the use of trade representatives as intermediaries in debates on tobacco regulation. This issue is particularly important in the current context of the review of several European policies concerning tobacco and nicotine. Discussions focus in particular on taxation, new nicotine products, e-cigarettes, heated tobacco, and the evolution of the European framework for tobacco control.

A composition that does not entirely correspond to the claimed profile

The composition of the CTS board of directors raises several questions regarding the representation of independent businesses. Its chairman, Pieter Vlamings, runs a gas station. The treasurer, Wouter van de Bunt, manages a Jumbo supermarket in Apeldoorn and explains that he opened a tobacco shop to maintain his business after the ban on selling tobacco in supermarkets. Ed Meeuw is also active in the retail sector and runs a tobacco shop concurrently. Sebas Gras and Roy van den Hoogen are active in the specialty retail sector. The latter notably operates a Primera store in The Hague, an address also used by the CTS. This composition is noteworthy since the collective presents itself as the voice of "tabacsspeciaalzaken" (tobacconists' specialty businesses), while several of its leaders are linked to broader commercial activities: supermarkets, gas stations, or distribution networks. The situation is particularly interesting concerning Primera, a Dutch chain of convenience stores that includes tobacco outlets. The organization has also developed the Volado network, dedicated to tobacco retailers. These factors therefore qualify the portrayal of the CTS as an organization composed exclusively of small, isolated, independent retailers.

Alongside its services, the collective offers its members various commercial offerings: insurance, discounts on certain transaction costs, and the installation of advertising screens designed to generate additional revenue. The CTS thus presents itself both as a political influence organization and as a service provider for retailers.

This phenomenon echoes the repeated calls from tobacco control experts to enforce the FCTC

The Dutch case is part of a broader phenomenon of indirect lobbying and representation by third parties, observed in other Member States and in EU institutions.

Tobacco control experts such as TabakNee in the Netherlands and the National Committee Against Smoking in France emphasize that the application of Article 5.3 of the FCTC is essential for protecting public policy. They specifically recommend limiting interactions with the tobacco industry, ensuring transparency in these interactions, rejecting partnerships with the industry, and strengthening awareness of interference strategies. They also stress that Article 5.3 does not only concern direct contact with manufacturers: authorities must also consider actors who "work to promote" the industry's interests. The principle, therefore, is not to limit the focus to identifying tobacco companies themselves, but to also examine organizations, trade associations, or other intermediaries likely to represent their interests.

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[1]Tabaksspecializaken beginnen new lobbyclub CTS, TabakNee, published on September 7, 2026, accessed the same day

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