Civil society is raising the alarm about the lack of transparency of EU institutions in the face of tobacco lobbying.

While several key texts of European anti-smoking policy are being revised, notably the Tobacco Products Directive and the Taxation Directive, civil society[1] Warnings have been raised about a persistent lack of transparency within European institutions. Despite the obligations stemming from Article 5.3 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, which mandates strict limitations on interactions with the tobacco industry and ensures transparency when such interactions occur, meetings continue to take place with industry representatives, sometimes without clear traceability. In a context of intense regulatory activity, these practices are fueling growing concerns about the risk of interference and the ability of European institutions to effectively protect public health policies.

Adopted within the framework of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, Article 5.3 requires Parties to protect their public health policies from the commercial and special interests of the tobacco industry. In practical terms, this means limiting interactions with the industry to what is strictly necessary for regulating the industry and its products, and excluding the industry from all other matters. Where the participation of industry representatives is possible, the transparency of these interactions must be guaranteed. This principle is now an international standard based on decades of documenting the industry's strategies for influencing public policy.

European institutions still marked by areas of uncertainty

The available data[2] These findings confirm the extent of the gap between principles and practices. In Brussels, at least 49 organizations linked to the tobacco industry are declared active, mobilizing nearly €14 million annually and more than 130 lobbyists to influence European decision-making processes. This structured presence is accompanied by a significant volume of interactions with public decision-makers: 257 meetings with Members of the European Parliament were recorded between 2023 and 2025. Meanwhile, the European Commission officially reported only five meetings, a major discrepancy that calls into question the comprehensiveness and reliability of existing transparency mechanisms.

Within the Commission, while the health services generally apply the provisions of Article 5.3 and its guidelines, other directorates-general continue to rely on traditional interest representation frameworks, particularly in the areas of trade and external relations. Documented exchanges with industry players, including Philip Morris International, suggest a partial and non-cross-cutting application of the obligations stemming from the Framework Convention. This fragmentation was already highlighted in 2016 by the European Ombudsman, who denounced a lack of transparency in the relationship between the Commission and the tobacco industry – an observation that remains largely relevant today.

The European Parliament also appears insufficiently equipped to prevent these risks of interference. While a requirement exists to declare meetings with lobbyists, its implementation remains incomplete. Entries in the transparency register are often imprecise ("introductory meeting," "smoking," "courtesy visit"), and control and sanction mechanisms are very rarely used. This situation leaves considerable room for inconsistent practices, relying more on the individual vigilance of parliamentarians than on a binding institutional framework.

Finally, the Council of the European Union remains the most opaque institution in this area. The lack of a harmonized framework and the reliance on national practices of Member States result in highly variable levels of protection. Some states adopt rigorous approaches, while others echo talking points from the tobacco industry. This heterogeneity, combined with the poor traceability of trade, severely limits external oversight and reinforces concerns about indirect but powerful influence in shaping European positions.

In this context, civil society denounces a system in which transparency rules, although formally established, remain insufficiently applied and fail to effectively prevent interference strategies. This observation is all the more worrying given that no improvement has emerged from evaluations, while numerous key texts are currently under revision.

A weakened vigilance in a context of major legislative revisions

This lack of transparency comes at a pivotal moment for European anti-smoking policies. Several key directives are currently being revised or evaluated, particularly the Tobacco Products Directive (TPD), along with the Advertising Directive and the Tax Directive. The priorities identified by civil society are now clearly established: extending the scope to all nicotine products, allowing Member States to ban emerging products not covered by the 2014 directive, reducing the appeal of these products through stricter regulations on flavorings and packaging, increasing regulation of marketing practices (especially digital), better coordination with tax policies, and the implementation of a monitoring and traceability system that is completely independent of manufacturers. The publication of an ambitious revision proposal remains delayed, in a context marked by persistent pressure from industry stakeholders. Through arguments focused on "risk reduction", "substitution" or "regulatory simplification", they seek to influence the direction of the European framework and limit the scope of the measures envisaged.

In this context, civil society plays a key role in monitoring and raising awareness, but its capacity for action is weakened by resource constraints and incomplete access to information. Added to this are attacks from tobacco lobbies challenging existing regulations. The lack of traceability in exchanges with the industry limits democratic oversight and fosters a risk of indirect influence on public policy. This situation reflects a persistent tension between public health objectives and special economic interests. The drive for regulatory simplification can lead to a weakening of monitoring tools, even though the measures deemed restrictive by the industry (reporting obligations, packaging rules, marketing and promotional restrictions) are essential levers for regulating a constantly evolving market.

In this context, the upcoming revision of the directives is a crucial test for the credibility of European action both within the European Union and internationally. It must not only address the identified shortcomings but also ensure a decision-making process fully compliant with the requirements of Article 5.3 of the WHO Framework Convention on Diseases. Strengthening its application, extending it to all European institutions, and improving transparency standards appear essential to preserving the integrity of public decisions and ensuring the primacy of health objectives.

©Generation Without Tobacco

AE

[1] Investigation - The difficulty of controlling tobacco lobbying within European institutions, Context, published on April 27, 2026, accessed the same day

[2] The tobacco lobby at the heart of the European Union, Tobacco-Free Generation, published on December 13, 2025, accessed on April 27, 2026

National Committee Against Smoking |