The tobacco lobby at the heart of the European Union

A new report from Contre-Feuet STOP, «Behind Closed Doors: How the Tobacco Lobby Influences the European Union and Beyond», The report highlights the extent of the pressure exerted by the tobacco industry on European institutions. The investigation identifies at least 49 organizations active within the EU, mobilizing 139 people and nearly €14 million annually to influence public policy. Between 2023 and 2025, 257 meetings with Members of the European Parliament were documented, while several contacts with the European Commission, notably through DG TRADE, were not made public. The report also shows how these actors seek to leverage the EU's diplomatic and commercial influence to challenge health policies in at least ten third countries. These findings raise questions about the European Union's compliance with its obligations under the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), particularly Article 5.3, which mandates the protection of health policies from tobacco industry interference.[1].

A report that documents the influence of the tobacco lobby in Brussels

The "Behind Closed Doors" report draws on an analysis of the EU Transparency Register, the database of meetings between Members of the European Parliament and lobbyists, and a series of access to documents requests sent to several Directorates-General of the European Commission (DG SANTE, DG TRADE, DG TAXUD, DG ENV, DG AGRI). This approach provides an initial overview of the tobacco industry's lobbying network in Brussels, as well as its connections within advisory organizations, professional associations, and structures promoting new nicotine products.

The authors identify at least 49 organizations seeking to influence European decisions to the benefit of the tobacco industry. Together, these actors report employing at least 139 people dedicated to lobbying activities and spending nearly €14 million annually on their lobbying efforts with EU institutions. The report emphasizes that this figure is likely an underestimate, as it relies on voluntary declarations and does not account for all the organizations that intervene indirectly or partially on tobacco-related issues. Beyond international cigarette manufacturers (including Philip Morris International, British American Tobacco, Japan Tobacco International, and Imperial Brands), the study highlights the role of numerous umbrella organizations and specialized consulting firms, as well as the growing influence of organizations presenting themselves as advocates for "harm reduction" or "new products" (heated tobacco, e-cigarettes, nicotine pouches). Eight of these "harm reduction" focused organisations have been created in the last three years, illustrating the reorientation of some lobbying towards the promotion of these products.

A constant presence within European institutions

Between January 2023 and September 2025, 257 meetings between representatives of industry or its allies and members of the European Parliament were recorded. Philip Morris International appears to be one of the most active actors, with more than 120 meetings recorded during this period. By comparison, public health organizations specializing in tobacco control report a much lower number of meetings, highlighting an imbalance in access to decision-makers.

On the European Commission's side, only five meetings with industry representatives were officially declared for the recent period. However, documents obtained through access to documents requests reveal several additional meetings, particularly with representatives of DG TRADE, which do not appear in public records. The investigation also highlights the existence of regular contact via email, telephone calls, or informal exchanges, which are difficult to trace within current transparency mechanisms.

These findings echo concerns already raised in 2023 by the European Ombudsman, who concluded that there was a situation of "poor governance" in the management of interactions between the Commission and the tobacco industry. She considered that the safeguards provided for in Article 5.3 of the FCTC (Fast Tobacco Control Convention), which apply to all EU institutions, were not being properly implemented outside of DG SANTE (Directorate-General for Health). The report also highlights the structural lack of transparency within the Council of the European Union, for which data on meetings with lobbyists remains very limited, even though this institution plays a central role in the adoption of EU legislation.

Targeted investments and lobbying efforts amplified by certain member states

The investigation highlights that the tobacco industry's influence at the European level also relies on close economic ties with certain member states. Significant industrial presence or substantial investments in heated tobacco factories have been identified in Italy, Greece, Romania, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. In these countries, the tobacco lobby uses arguments related to employment and investment to lobby for more favorable positions within the Council.

The report notes that several of these states are among the most reluctant to strengthen tobacco taxation or to more strictly regulate new nicotine products, for example, during discussions on revising the European directive on tobacco taxation or on regulating nicotine pouches. This interplay between economic presence, lobbying, and political stances illustrates a kind of "anchoring effect" of the industry in certain national contexts, which could influence the adoption of ambitious measures at the EU level.

When the European Union is used to challenge health policies around the world

One of the most sensitive aspects of the report concerns the use of the European Union's commercial and diplomatic weight by certain tobacco companies to challenge health policies adopted in third countries. The documents analyzed show that Philip Morris International repeatedly requested that DG TRADE intervene with the governments of at least ten countries, including Argentina, Brazil, India, Japan, Mexico, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, and Vietnam.

These efforts primarily target strict bans or restrictions on heated tobacco products or new forms of nicotine, as well as tax measures aligning the taxation of these products with that of cigarettes. In several cases, the industry presents these public health measures as "barriers to trade" or violations of World Trade Organization rules, and explicitly requests the Commission to intervene in bilateral trade dialogues or trade policy discussions. The report notably describes a case where the Commission reiterated, in a series of questions addressed to a partner country and in an annual report, arguments previously provided by the tobacco company against national regulations. This sequence is described by Philip Morris International in an email as "valuable assistance," leading several media outlets to question the line between listening to stakeholders and taking a position that benefits a specific commercial actor.

For the authors, these situations raise a double risk: on the one hand, that of seeing the EU appear as a relay for the interests of the tobacco industry in countries often with low or middle income; on the other hand, that of weakening the credibility of the Union in international forums where it presents itself as a driving force in the fight against smoking.

Transparency obligations still insufficient in light of the CCLT

The report recalls that the European Union is a Party to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. Article 5.3 of this convention requires States and regional economic integration organizations to protect health policies from the influence of the tobacco industry by strictly limiting contact to what is strictly necessary and ensuring full transparency of such interactions when they occur.

The authors believe, however, that the rules and practices in force in Brussels fall short of these requirements. The obligation to publish meeting minutes applies only to some of the Commission's officials and directorates-general, while many exchanges are considered informal and are not subject to any record-keeping. Responses to requests for access to documents are sometimes delayed, and entire sections of documents are withheld in the name of protecting commercial interests, including information relating to corporate influence on health policy development.

In the European Parliament, while the obligation to declare meetings with lobbyists has been strengthened following several scandals, the study highlights that the transparency register remains incomplete and that some tobacco-related organizations are either not registered or only partially declare their activities. As for the Council of the European Union, it remains the least transparent of the three major institutions, which limits the assessment of the role played by Member States in receiving messages from the tobacco industry.

Better protect health policies from industry interference

In conclusion, the report makes a series of recommendations aimed at strengthening the protection of public policies against interference from the tobacco lobby. The authors call on all EU institutions to fully implement Article 5.3 of the FCTC, extending transparency obligations to all departments and staff who interact with the industry, regardless of their hierarchical level. They recommend that interactions with tobacco representatives be strictly limited to what is necessary for the regulation of tobacco products and the industry, and that these interactions be systematically documented in detail, including attendees, agendas, and points discussed. The report also recommends that the transparency rules applicable to European institutions be strengthened through legally binding texts, including dissuasive sanctions for non-compliance. It proposes to include explicit references to the tobacco industry and the FCTC in the 2021 interinstitutional agreement on the transparency register, in the European regulation on access to documents and in the rules of procedure of the European Parliament.

Finally, the authors call on the European Union to make a clear commitment to no longer allow its diplomatic and commercial influence to be used to challenge or weaken tobacco control measures adopted by third countries, particularly when these measures comply with the UNFCCC.[2]. The separation between public health policies and the economic interests of the tobacco industry is presented as an essential condition for sustainably reducing the burden of smoking, which remains responsible for approximately 700,000 premature deaths each year in the European Union.

This new analysis is part of a growing body of research showing that achieving public health objectives in Europe depends as much on strengthening regulations as on the ability of institutions to protect themselves from the influence strategies of actors whose interests are in direct conflict and irreconcilable with those of health.

©Generation Without Tobacco

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[1] Press release,  Tobacco Corporations Are Using the EU to Weaken Health Policies Worldwide, STOP, published on December 10, accessed the same day

[2] Kathryn Kranhold, Jason McLure,Rory O'Neill And Antonia Zimmermann, EU officials acted to aid tobacco giant abroad, documents show, The Examination, published on December 10, 2025, accessed the same day