Huub Savelkouls, architect of the Philip Morris International transformation story

Former Philip Morris International (PMI) executive Huub Savelkouls is widely identified as the architect of the company's "smoke-free" narrative. A 26-year PMI employee, he orchestrated tax, lobbying, and communications strategies designed to present "potentially reduced risk" products not as a diversification, but as a "responsible" replacement for traditional cigarettes.[1]His influence continues today, as he continues to act as a consultant on public policy and nicotine products.

A career dedicated to lobbying

Huub Savelkouls joined Philip Morris International in the early 1990s, having trained as an economist. He quickly established himself as a key player in the company's tax and regulatory affairs. His first assignments consisted of developing economic models to measure the effect of excise duty increases on tobacco sales and tax revenues. Presented as technical tools, these calculations became instrumental in PMI's lobbying strategy to convince governments and steer tax policies in favor of the industry.

His career then led him to the vice-presidency in charge of fiscal affairs and international trade. In this position, he advocated for the establishment of differentiated taxation systems based on the "risk level" of products, in order to make taxation more advantageous for new forms of nicotine consumption, particularly heated tobacco. This orientation is part of a broader strategy aimed at influencing the way in which decision-makers perceive these products, by placing them in a register of harm reduction rather than that of tobacco control.

His role extends beyond taxation. Appointed PMI's first Chief Sustainability Officer, he is tasked with developing a comprehensive transformation narrative for the company, linking business strategy with broader themes of social and environmental responsibility.

This repositioning paves the way for the company's return to public and political debates, both at the European and international levels. Under the guise of sustainability, PMI intervenes on issues such as differentiated taxation of nicotine products and the environmental management of cigarette waste. These positions promote industry initiatives while challenging more restrictive measures, such as the banning of filters or the strict application of the polluter-pays principle. Thus, Huub Savelkouls' career has contributed to repositioning PMI in its image and development strategy.

After a stint at Deloitte, a company with ties to the cigarette manufacturer, Huub Savelkouls now continues his work as an independent consultant, specializing in three areas: climate change and the energy transition, 21st-century tax policy, and public health policies related to nicotine. It was in this capacity that he recently took part in the conference New Approaches in New York, where he reaffirmed his belief that cigarettes could disappear if they were replaced by alternatives presented as "less harmful." According to him, however, this would require governments "rethink their tobacco policies and accept the uncomfortable truth that a world without nicotine is neither realistic nor necessarily desirable." He explains that he advises organizations wishing to promote what he calls a nicotine policy. “more rational and more humane”. This position illustrates the continuity of his role as advisor, now exercised outside of PMI, but still focused on defending a model favorable to the nicotine industry.

The “transition” narrative: an apparent strategy of rupture

In 2015, Huub Savelkouls took the helm of a new strategic direction for PMI: repositioning alternative products, and in particular heated tobacco, as genuine substitutes for cigarettes and not simply as a diversification of its offering. The company thus intends to project the image of a player in "transformation," where the gradual abandonment of combustible tobacco becomes a pillar of institutional discourse.

This "transition" is carefully staged. PMI claims to be moving away from conventional cigarettes to focus on so-called "reduced-risk" products, presented as options for smokers who do not wish to give up nicotine. This narrative aims to convince decision-makers and the public that the company can be a partner in public health rather than a sector to be strictly regulated. This narrative is based on sustainability, which is placed at the center of its communications. As director of sustainable development, Savelkouls combines innovation, social responsibility, and environmental commitment to reinforce the image of a "responsible" company, focused on a healthier future.

In practice, this strategy translates into a proliferation of communication initiatives and messages aimed at stakeholders, particularly decision-makers. New products are systematically presented as an unavoidable market development, justifying an adaptation of regulatory frameworks, whether in terms of taxation, advertising, or the environment. The transition discourse thus becomes a lobbying lever, intended to obtain a more favorable framework for the deployment of alternatives, while maintaining the mass sale of traditional cigarettes.

This dual movement—promoting transformation on the one hand, continuing historical activities on the other—illustrates Savelkouls's recovery strategy. It aims to reposition PMI as a manufacturer of nicotine products, and an actor apparently undergoing radical change, likely to be legitimately involved in matters of health and sustainability.

The Cost and Extent of Lobbying: Revelations from the "Philip Morris Files"

Documents made public in the context of the " Philip Morris Files » provide a detailed overview of the extent of the resources deployed by PMI to influence European regulations. They show that during the revision of the Tobacco Products Directive (TPD) in 2012 and 2013, the company mobilized at least 161 people to carry out lobbying activities, combining its own staff and external consultants. This figure contrasts sharply with the nine lobbyists officially declared by PMI to the European Union Transparency Register. This discrepancy illustrates a clear underestimation of the resources actually devoted to political influence.

Financially, internal documents estimate Philip Morris International's lobbying expenditures for 2012 at just over €1.24 million, based on partial information that does not cover the entire period. This figure, while already substantial, remains significantly lower than the probable reality of the resources committed. By comparison, the combined annual profit margin of the four main tobacco groups—of which PMI is the largest—is around $80 billion, and the company itself declares having invested more than $14 billion in research and development alone. These orders of magnitude put into perspective the potential scale of resources that can be mobilized for influence activities, of which the officially declared amounts reflect only a fraction. These expenditures, which cover salaries, fees for specialized firms, and representation costs with decision-makers, confirm PMI's position among the most active and best-funded companies in terms of lobbying in Brussels.

The breakdown of spending also highlights targeted investment: the ten most expensive lobbyists absorb a significant portion of the overall budget. Huub Savelkouls ranks second in this ranking, with an estimated amount of €211,300.[2]This positioning reflects the central place it has been given within this influence strategy and confirms the place the cigarette manufacturer gives it for tax and communication issues.

These practices call into question PMI's compliance with European Union transparency rules, as well as the tobacco company's statements regarding its transparency obligations under the Public Health Code and the HATVP. The report highlights that the company provided incomplete or inaccurate data, which reduces the ability of institutions and citizens to measure the tobacco industry's true influence. The gap between official statements and operational reality highlights the limitations of current mechanisms for controlling lobbying activity at the European level and, more generally, within individual countries.

These revelations provide a concrete illustration of the need to monitor the provisions of Article 5.3 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), which requires States Parties to protect their public health policies from tobacco industry interference. The contrast between official statements and actual lobbying practices highlights how the industry circumvents existing laws to continue to exert significant influence on legislative debates. Ensuring rigorous enforcement of this article, particularly through increased monitoring and the ability to investigate statements made, appears essential to limit the industry's influence in tobacco control policies.

Similarly, the application of strict rules of ethics by public decision-makers in their relations with representatives of the tobacco industry constitutes a counterpart to this measure.

©Generation Without Tobacco

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[1] Huub Savelkouls: the brain behind PMI's narrative transformation, TabakNee, published September 30, 2025, accessed October 3, 2025

[2] Top 10 Most Expensive Lobbyists – The Philip Morris Files, Part 3, TabakNee, published February 6, 2014, accessed October 3, 2025