Study highlights central role of tobacconists in blocking tax policies
April 5, 2024
Par: National Committee Against Smoking
Dernière mise à jour: April 5, 2024
Temps de lecture: 7 minutes
A study by the Revue du Losange and the Revue des Tabacs shows that tobacconists are key players in France in lobbying against the implementation of tax increases on tobacco products, which have been shown to be the most cost-effective tool for reducing smoking prevalence. According to the authors, the dual status of tobacconists (tobacco players and partners of public authorities) constitutes a major obstacle to guaranteeing the independence of public policies from the influence of the tobacco industry, and therefore for the implementation of public health policies.
This study is part of the study project "Forms and effects of lobbying by the tobacco industry and its allies in France" (FELITAF). This study aims to analyze the different discursive and instrumental strategies of opposition to tobacco tax policies, between 2000 and 2020, in two titles of the specialized press: the Revue du Losange and the Revue des Tabacs[1].
An intensification of the volume of articles at pivotal moments
Overall, the study collected nearly 3,400 articles between 2000 and 2020, devoted to the subject of taxation. The researchers observed that the volume of articles was particularly high in three periods, corresponding to key moments in anti-smoking policies. Thus, the first peak in publications (2003-2005) corresponds to the first Cancer Plan, which resulted in a strong tax trajectory on tobacco products. The second peak (2011-2014) corresponds to the debates on the question of the possible implementation of plain packaging or new tax increases on tobacco. Finally, the peak observed between 2017-2018 corresponds to the implementation of the tax trajectory of the ten-euro packet of cigarettes.
Illicit trade at the heart of the anti-tax discursive strategy
The analysis of the documents shows that opposition to tobacco product taxation is mainly structured, in these professional journals, around the argument that tax increases lead to unanticipated economic costs. Indeed, this broad category includes 87.6% of the 5966 arguments identified in all the articles listed. In particular, this idea of unanticipated costs is reflected, for example, by the idea that tax policies would promote illicit trade, cross-border trade or even organized crime. This study highlights that the mobilization of this type of argument is recurrent on the part of the tobacco industry, in particular to oppose tax increase policies on its products. However, the available public health data do not confirm an increase in illicit tobacco trade, nor a correlation between tax policies and the evolution of parallel markets.
The central role of tobacconists in the discourse against tax policies
The authors also show that many arguments specific to the French context report the difficulties of tobacconists due to tobacco tax policies. In this sense, the arguments point to the importance of cross-border trade, the significant tariff differences with certain cross-border markets, and the associated loss of customers for a certain number of businesses established near borders. The analysis shows that the various articles detail a certain number of proposals on the issue of tobacco taxation, such as the need for European harmonization, the limitation of individual quantities of tobacco to be transported, the establishment of a moratorium on tobacco taxation, or even public support for the tobacconist profession. Furthermore, the authors show that they are presented as essential players in French social life, by ensuring local trade, particularly in rural areas. In several articles, the increase in tobacco taxes is described as potentially endangering this positive social role played by tobacconists. Here again, it can be added that the penalization of the tobacconist network by tax policies does not necessarily correspond to reality. Indeed, since the remuneration of tobacconists is proportional to the selling price of a packet of cigarettes, it has changed significantly according to tax policies. Thus, the gross remuneration of a tobacconist between 2007 and 2022 increased by more than 170%, compensating for losses linked to the drop in sales volumes. Furthermore, it can also be noted that tobacconists benefit from strong financial support from the public authorities.
Demonstrations, meetings of decision-makers: tobacconists’ strategies analyzed
The authors also look at lobbying strategies in the specialist press. These include organising events, such as demonstrations, to put pressure on public decision-making. The study also shows a strategy of creating external alliances with public decision-makers (parliamentarians, ministers, etc.) aimed at defending the interests of the tobacco sector, particularly in border areas. Another lobbying strategy identified consists of producing and disseminating "evidence" aimed at supporting the claim that cross-border purchases are a major issue. This strategy, which refers to the issue of information management, can also be embodied by discrediting anti-smoking actors, by associating them with a "sect" or "ayatollahs". Finally, the study reports on direct lobbying strategies, particularly on the part of tobacconists, resulting in meetings with political decision-makers.
The question of the problematic status of tobacconists
Overall, the authors highlight that tobacconists play a key role in lobbying strategies to block or minimize tobacco tax policies. These findings echo the results of a study devoted to analyzing the treatment of the issue of taxation in the French general press between 2000 and 2020[2], as well as the results from a study devoted to parliamentary questions over the same period. Furthermore, the authors of this article believe that the status of tobacconists, who are both tobacco players and administrative agents, may be problematic in ensuring the protection of public policies with regard to the interests of the tobacco sector. However, this guarantee against the influence of these players constitutes an obligation, under Article 5.3 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, ratified by France in 2004.
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[1] Millot A, Beguinot E, Petticrew M, et al, Lobbying against tobacco tax increases in France: arguments and strategies of the tobacco industry and tobacconists analyzed through their trade press, Tobacco Control Published Online First: 29 March 2024. doi: 10.1136/tc-2023-058254 [2] Geigneau, D.; Guillou-Landréat, M.; Gallopel-Morvan, K. Tobacco Tax Increases: A Discourse Analysis of the French Print and Web News Media from 2000 to 2020. Int. J. Approx. Res. Public Health 2022, 19, 15152. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph192215152 National Committee Against Smoking |