In Bangladesh, conflicts of interest hamper implementation of FCTC Article 5.3

A study examines Bangladesh's difficulties in freeing itself from tobacco industry influences, which include the personal involvement of officials in the industry and the isolation of the unit responsible for implementing the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC).

The situation in Bangladesh, highlighted by a study, appears far from the requirements of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, which it was one of the first countries to ratify in 2004. The state still holds stakes in tobacco companies and the tobacco tax system remains very favourable to manufacturers. The study also revealed that ministers sit on the board of British American Tobacco Bangladesh (BATB) and received emoluments just one month after their appointment.

Ministers in flagrant conflict of interest

Article 5.3 of the FCTC states that public health policies must be protected from the influence of the tobacco industry. The reluctance of the Bangladeshi authorities to implement this key article and other anti-smoking measures was studied by a team of Bengali and Scottish researchers. A qualitative study was conducted with representatives of the relevant ministries, as well as civil society actors, researchers and think tanks. It revealed the close links between members of the Bengali government and certain tobacco manufacturers, and these links appear to be one of the major obstacles to the implementation of Article 5.3 and the establishment of a code of good conduct by the Bengali public authorities.[1]. Other difficulties encountered by the National Tobacco Control Cell (NTCC) would also partly explain the stagnation of the anti-smoking policy.

A significant example occurred in April 2020, during the first COVID-19 lockdown: a letter from BATB to the then Minister of Industry requested that tobacco sales be continued uninterrupted as “essential goods”; a similar letter from United Dhaka Tobacco, a subsidiary of Japan Tobacco International, went exactly the same way. This request was implemented the next day, which is quite unusual given the traditional decision-making process, an institutional representative confirmed. Other examples of conflicts of interest, such as a minister’s son driving a BATB-branded car or highlighting the personal situation of ministers in the face of public health issues (“Suppose my brother works in the tobacco industry and his daughter is getting married. Should I not go to his daughter’s wedding?”), support this collusion between the tobacco industry and members of the government and institutions.

Lack of understanding of the FCTC and its implications

The study also shows that the FCTC is very little known among government officials. While the NTCC is an expert on the FCTC, it is only known by some members of the Ministry of Health and remains ignored by those in the Ministries of Agriculture, Commerce, Industry and Finance, who are precisely the main obstacles to tobacco control and believe that the provisions of the FCTC apply only to the Ministry of Health. The tensions, both institutional and personal, between these different ministries highlight the contradiction between private economic interests and public health, although the latter is theoretically guaranteed by the Bengali constitution. The predominance given to economic issues and tax collection in a context of the country's growth, however, neglects the weight of smoking on the overall state budget and its role as a brake on development.

The isolation of civil society actors

This proximity between industrialists and public actors explains in particular the difficulties of the NTCC in asserting its points of view and proposing to establish a code of good conduct intended for institutional actors. Attached to the Ministry of Health, technically supported by the United Nations and financially by Bloomberg Initiatives, the NTCC remains a small structure without real authority, whose messages are only very rarely relayed and which seems very isolated. It is not included in the decision-making loop concerning tobacco products, while industrialists are officially integrated into it, and the decisions adopted only reach it after the fact. Its meager financial resources, its lack of influence which harms its coordination mission and the absence of contacts with other ministries appear to be the main weaknesses of this structure, the fight against smoking requiring on the contrary strong collaboration between the various government bodies.

The NTCC's draft code of conduct and its desire to implement Article 5.3 nevertheless remain essential objectives, with compliance with Article 5.3 having already been identified as one of the essential conditions for advancing the fight against tobacco.[2]. Another recent study, meanwhile, indicated that 30% of Bengalis would be willing to give up smoking if the price of cigarettes increased significantly.[3], thus confirming the influence of tobacco price on the smoking behavior of disadvantaged populations. Bangladesh's stated goal of achieving a tobacco-free generation by 2040 will certainly require aligning all these prerequisites.

Keywords: Bangladesh, Article 5.3, CCLAT, conflicts of interest, BAT ©Tobacco Free Generation

M.F.

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[1] Abdullah SM, Wagner-Rizvi T, Huque R, Kanan S, Huque S, Ralston R, Collin J. 'A contradiction between our state and the tobacco company': con icts of interest and institutional constraints as barriers to implementing Article 5.3 in Bangladesh. Tob Control, Epub ahead of print: [01/27/2022]. doi:10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2021-057142. [2] Puska P, Daube M, WHO FCTC Impact Assessment Expert Group. Impact assessment of the framework convention on tobacco control: introduction, general findings and discussion. Tob Control 2019;28:s81–3. [3] 30% people to quit smoking if cigarette prices go up significantly: Survey, The Business Standard, published January 26, 2022, accessed January 27, 2022. National Committee Against Smoking |