Fight against illicit tobacco: internal documents reveal BAT's business and political objectives

A University of Bath study based on internal British American Tobacco (BAT) documents concludes that the company's anti-illicit tobacco trade program, launched in 2004, had as its primary objectives increasing sales and regulatory influence, rather than reducing smuggling or controlling its own supply chains.[1].

A strategy born after the company was implicated in organizing illicit trade

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, investigations and legal proceedings concerning the complicity of large transnational tobacco companies in smuggling helped to reveal the true nature of the industry's practices and damaged the sector's image. According to the authors, smuggling then represented a significant portion of BAT's export activities: internal estimates cited in the study placed it between 57 and 68 percent of its export activity in 1994.

In 2008, BAT pleaded guilty in Canada to smuggling charges, resulting in a criminal fine of 200 million Canadian dollars and civil penalties of up to 350 million Canadian dollars. The company subsequently signed memoranda of understanding with governments. This corporate involvement in smuggling also extended to other manufacturers. In Europe in 2000, major players in the sector were prosecuted by the European Commission and ten member states, including France, for "« a global organization aiming to smuggle cigarettes, launder drug trafficking proceeds, obstruct government oversight of the tobacco industry, unfairly fix prices, bribe foreign public officials, and make illegal trade with terrorist groups and states sponsoring acts of  »[2]. Following this complaint, a legally binding cooperation agreement was reached between the various tobacco manufacturers and the European Union, accompanied by a payment of one billion dollars: 200 million dollars were paid by BAT. The objective of the agreement was to combat the illicit trade in tobacco products. It was in this context that BAT created a central unit dedicated to illicit trade in 2004, the Anti-Illicit Trade Unit (AITU). Officially, its purpose was to raise awareness of the threats posed by illicit trade and to provide governments with information, intelligence, and advice.

Commercial and political objectives

An analysis of 92 internal documents, drawn from a pool of approximately 15,000 documents primarily covering East and Central Africa, Southern Africa, and the Middle East between 2000 and 2014, identifies two central objectives of the program. The first was to increase BAT's revenue and market share by capturing "contestable space"—that is, the market share its products could theoretically capture. In other words, contraband markets are an integral part of manufacturers' development markets, which they need to control. The second objective was to strengthen the company's influence on public policy, particularly regarding taxation and its efforts to circumvent the provisions of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). This treaty provides a range of particularly effective measures to sustainably reduce tobacco consumption and includes a general obligation (Article 5.3) explicitly mandating the protection of policies from tobacco industry interference. This protection is achieved, in particular, by excluding manufacturers from the decision-making process. An internal document from 2006 describes the strategy as a "reputation initiative" aimed at securing "a seat at the table" to discuss excise taxes and the UNFCCC.

The documents cited by the researchers present the program's success as an increase in volumes and market share, a rise in "available profit," or the creation of growth opportunities. Priority markets identified in 2011 included Brazil, Canada, Germany, Malaysia, South Africa, Romania, and Turkey.

Operations primarily targeting competitors

The authors identified 45 anti-illicit trade operations, conducted primarily in East, Central, and Southern Africa. None of these operations targeted BAT products diverted to illicit channels, while 21 focused on smaller competitors not belonging to major transnational tobacco companies, including 14 involving Mastermind Tobacco Kenya. These operations included investigations, seizures, searches, arrests, physical and electronic surveillance, the use of informants and undercover agents, and the training of customs, police, and judicial authorities. Internal documents also indicate that external contractors were employed to create a "buffer zone" between BAT and these sensitive practices.

The study also notes that BAT appeared reluctant to tackle the illicit tobacco trade if competitors were to fill the resulting market vacuum. An internal document concerning Ethiopia warned that such an operation would only create an opportunity for Philip Morris International or illicit traffickers.

Cooperation with authorities and regulatory influence

The program also relied on relationships with government agencies, international organizations, and the media. BAT's intelligence unit was specifically tasked with cooperating with national authorities and organizations such as Interpol, the World Customs Organization, the UN, and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), while also training investigators, tax authorities, prosecutors, and judges. The documents analyzed show that BAT viewed its agreement with the European Union as a way to enhance its ability to participate in regulatory debates, strengthen its relationships with the EU and its member states, and create business opportunities while controlling these parallel markets.

According to the study, this close relationship with the authorities raises the issue of possible "regulatory capture," meaning that rules and their application are steered in the direction of industry interests rather than the public interest. The researchers emphasize that these practices directly contravened Article 5.3 of the UNFCCC.

A call to strengthen the transparency and independence of the fight against illicit tobacco

The authors acknowledge several limitations of their study: the accessible documents primarily concern Africa and the Middle East; they do not provide access to BAT management deliberations and do not necessarily cover all of the company's activities. However, they believe that training materials intended for regional managers demonstrate that the London-based management conceived the program's broad objectives with an internationally defined strategy. According to the researchers, these elements justify governments re-examining their partnerships with transnational tobacco companies in the fight against illicit trade and strengthening safeguards against industry interference. They call for official investigations into BAT's activities. They also advocate for independent data, traceability systems not controlled by the industry, and increased scrutiny of partner organizations by authorities, thus directly criticizing the current tracking and tracing system in place at the European Union level.

For several years, the WHO has pointed out that cigarette manufacturers have played a role in this trade, while using the argument of smuggling to oppose tax increases and weaken public health policies. Despite Article 5.3 of the FCTC, Many governments continue to give in to pressure from manufacturers, delaying or weakening public health protection measures.. The new study focusing on BAT's internal documents follows this trend. It sheds further light on how a major company in the sector was able to establish itself as a partner of the authorities in the fight against illicit tobacco, even though its agenda appears to have been geared towards capturing market share and exerting regulatory influence, while maintaining control over these parallel markets. In this context, health stakeholders hope that the European Commission's proposal to revise the Tobacco Products Directive will include measures to reform the current monitoring and traceability system, which remains essentially controlled by tobacco companies.

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[1]Gomis B., Gallagher A., Rowell A., et al., ‘'To increase the available profit pool' and 'get a seat at the table': using internal documents to understand British American Tobacco's anti-illicit tobacco program, Tobacco Control, published on October 16, 2026, accessed on October 19, 2026

[2]European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., Philip Morris, Japan Tobacco, et al. (in particular registered under the file numbers) 00 Civ. 6617 And 02 Civ. 164 (before Judge Nicholas Garaufis)

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