New Zealand: Anti-tobacco policies poorly protected from the industry

A qualitative study published in Tobacco Control[1] This study examines how New Zealand is implementing Article 5.3 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), which requires Parties to protect their health policies from the commercial interests of the tobacco industry. Despite the country's international reputation in tobacco control, researchers at the University of Auckland found limited, delayed, and largely reactive implementation: of the 34 measures recommended by the guidelines for implementing Article 5.3, only one is actually being implemented, in the form of appointment registers maintained solely by the Ministry of Health and Customs.

The study is based on the country's institutional characteristics and a qualitative study analyzing how public actors apply the texts and provisions of this article of the WHO treaty. Twenty-one semi-structured interviews were conducted between March 2021 and May 2023 with members of parliament, ministers, senior civil servants, political journalists, and current or former public health experts. Officials from the Ministry of Health who were contacted did not respond to the request to participate in the study. These interviews were cross-referenced with a documentary study that included: an analysis of reference texts such as international and national legal instruments, and the biennial reports on the implementation of the FCTC submitted by New Zealand between 2007 and 2023. This was supplemented by responses obtained under the Official Information Act (Official Information Act 1982), 161 published ministerial agenda summaries, as well as internal industry documents from the Truth Tobacco Industry Documents Library. The authors point out that the absence of any obligation to disclose lobbying in New Zealand has made it impossible to measure the true extent of the tobacco industry's activities.

A transparency obligation limited to appointment records only.

The implementation guidelines for Article 5.3 comprise eight general recommendations broken down into 34 specific measures, intended to apply to all institutional actors in the country. In New Zealand, implementation is essentially limited to Recommendation 2.2, concerning the transparency of interactions with industry, as evidenced by appointment records. Even then, this application is restricted to recording appointments with the Ministry of Health and the Customs Service, whereas the measure applies to all government ministries as well as other institutions. Consequently, industry's interactions with other government departments are not subject to any reporting. The public health experts interviewed describe "guidelines that have remained a dead letter since their adoption", and the analysis of the biennial reports sent to the FCTC confirms this inertia: in 2010, two years after the adoption of the guidelines, the Ministry of Health still indicated that it was "examining how to implement the guidelines of Article 5.3".

This widespread failure is being exploited by the industry to exert considerable influence on policymakers and beyond. The documents analyzed show that between 2018 and 2019, Philip Morris International (PMI) directly approached public hospitals to offer its heated tobacco products for use in smoking cessation trials. The manufacturer met with an advisory group attached to the Treasury and the tax authorities to obtain preferential tax treatment for these same products. When questioned about these events, the director of a hospital replied that his institution "has no policy regarding relations with the tobacco industry"; it was only after media attention that the Directorate General of Health reminded hospitals of their obligations under Article 5.3. Furthermore, protections are not extended to emerging nicotine products, even though the treaty text covers all tobacco industry activities and the 2024 Conference of the Parties reminded Parties of this obligation. In 2019, internal documents from the vaping company JUUL Labs, of which Altria then held 35% of the capital, identified New Zealand parliamentarians and officials as "potential allies" during the drafting of vaping regulations, and showed that the company, rebuffed by the services of the Ministry of Health, managed to directly engage parliamentarians from several political parties.

Decision-makers who invoke media image rather than international law

The guidelines stipulate raising awareness among all relevant institutional stakeholders regarding industry interference strategies. Interviews, however, reveal a significant lack of understanding of Article 5.3 among political leaders, with one declaring himself "quite ready to admit" his ignorance of the mechanism. Several attribute the lack of industry engagement not to contractual protections, but to the industry's own calculations, deeming it pointless to approach elected officials whose positions are already fixed. When questioned about the guidelines governing their contacts with industry interests, they mention "political sensitivities" and the risk of negative media coverage, with one explaining his fear of the impact of a meeting "on the front page of the newspaper," while also believing that it would be "unhealthy, in our democracy, to refuse to sit down" with all parties.

This interpretation is doubly problematic. On the one hand, it substitutes a reputational and circumstantial assessment for a permanent legal obligation: what is not required by law becomes negotiable according to the political and media context. On the other hand, it echoes an argument long promoted by the tobacco industry, which consists of presenting the protections of Article 5.3 as contrary to the principles of "good governance" and democratic participation. However, WHO guidelines do not exclude all interaction, but they do require limiting it to what is strictly necessary (regulation of the sector and products) and demonstrating transparency when it occurs. The interviews also illustrate another tactic successfully deployed by the industry, which appears to be integrated into the analysis of the decision-makers themselves. These decision-makers distinguish between being "lobbyed" and being "approached" with regard to the more specific issue of illicit trade. Yet the provisions of Article 5.3 do not provide for any exemption, and indeed... Furthermore, the lessons from the literature show how illicit trade is a theme heavily used by the tobacco industry to influence all anti-tobacco policies in general.

The lack of regulation of lobbying, a blind spot in the system

The authors therefore make several recommendations: codify Article 5.3 into national law rather than relying on non-binding guidelines, extend protections to all government departments and Parliament, and train public officials to identify industry strategies, following the example of the guidance document adopted by Australia in 2019. They also recommend incorporating the Te Tiriti o Waitangi commitments and the leading role of Māori and Pacific Islander communities, the primary victims of setbacks, into tobacco control legislation. When contacted by the Science Media Centre, Professor Nick Wilson (University of Otago) noted that New Zealand ranks last out of 47 countries assessed by the OECD for lobbying regulations.

Due to the lack of binding transposition into domestic law, the protections provided for in Article 5.3 have remained, in New Zealand, an optional reference that each administration applies at its discretion, and the country remains exposed to interference from the tobacco industry. This vulnerability is not unrelated to the repeal, in March 2024, of the ban on sales to persons born after 2009 and other key measures of the "Smokefree 2025" strategy, which occurred against a backdrop of revelations concerning the targeting of New Zealand political leaders by Philip Morris International. As Professor Richard Edwards (University of Otago) points out, this work constitutes "a timely reminder of the fragility of the commitment" the country has to protect its health policies from the interests of the tobacco industry, a lesson that applies beyond the New Zealand case alone, to all Parties to the FCTC.

©Generation Without Tobacco

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[1] Gregan M, Wiles J, Nosa V, et al Tobacco industry interference and WHO FCTC Article 5.3 implementation in Aotearoa New Zealand: A qualitative analysis Tobacco Control Published Online First: 23 August 2026. doi: 10.1136/tc-2026-060161