In Australia, half of tobacco lobbyists have held positions in public executive bodies

A study indicates that Australian tobacco industry lobbyists often held a public executive position before or after their lobbying activities. The so-called "revolving door" tactic therefore appears to still be very active in this country.

Holding a public executive position before or after lobbying or holding a corporate position has often been referred to as the "revolving door" practice. This practice fosters influence over political decisions and is actively practiced by the tobacco industry, as well as the gambling, alcohol, and food industries. A recent study shows that this phenomenon has particularly developed in Australia with regard to tobacco and e-cigarettes.

Coming and going between government functions and lobbying activities

The Australian research team analyzed official records that lobbyists must fill out, activity on the LinkedIn social network, and news on the Google News and Factiva platforms between September 2021 and June 2022.[1]Of the 73 individuals who could be identified as former or current tobacco industry employees with dealings with officials, 35 (48 %) had previously or subsequently held a position within public executive bodies, whether at the federal, territorial or local level. Of the 56 individuals identified as lobbyists in the official registers, 31 (55 %) had held such an executive position before or after becoming lobbyists. The most common positions held were those of cabinet members or technical advisors to a ministry, but there were also 11 % of parliamentarians (senators, members of parliament) and 14 % of parliamentary advisors and staff.

The average length of time between these two activities was less than one year. Australian conflict of interest legislation, however, generally requires a gap of twelve to twenty-four months between a public executive function and a position in the private sector in the same field; in Canada, this period must normally be five years.

Third-party groups, the key to lobbying

This practice is reinforced by the use of third parties, most often secretly funded by tobacco companies. These groups allow lobbyists to be paid without them having any direct connection to the tobacco industry or affiliation with a lobbying firm—and therefore not being listed in lobbyist registers.

The study details how Philip Morris International (PMI) founded the Australian Retail Vaping Industry Association (ARVIA), which orchestrated a Senate inquiry into harm reduction to counter the government's plan to introduce a medical prescription for e-cigarettes. ARVIA acted in concert with the Australian Retail Association (ARA), which represents retailers. ARVIA was headed by Brett Chant, a former ministerial advisor recruited by the ARA, who later became a parliamentary advisor again without ever registering as a lobbyist. Another former ministerial advisor turned lobbyist, Jeremy Greenwood, had both ARVIA and ARA as clients before later registering as a lobbyist for British American Tobacco (BAT).

An attack on democracy and the principles of the FCTC

Although Australia does not have exclusivity over these practices, the scale of the phenomenon highlighted is both worrying in terms of the democratic health of the country and in terms of the obligations linked to the ratification of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (CCLAT). In terms of democracy, the parasitism of public action by private interests represents a threat to the public interest and is carried out to the detriment of the health of the population and the transparency decisions. With regard to the commitments made with the ratification of the FCTC, agreements between any public body and tobacco manufacturers are prohibited by the implementing directives of Article 5.3

To limit this back-and-forth between public executive positions and lobbying activities, the authors recommend imposing greater transparency on tobacco industry lobbying expenditures, whether directly or indirectly through third parties. Extending the waiting period between positions held and ensuring the effective implementation of these provisions are also among the suggested measures.[2]. Integrating this practice of "revolving doors" into the application of the FCTC implementation guidelines, which includes a whole section on the management of conflicts of interest, seems essential to the authors.

Keywords: Australia, lobbying, government, third-party groups, PMI, BAT.

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[1] Watts C, Jones M, Lindorff K, Freeman B. How tobacco companies use the revolving door between government and industry to influence policymaking: an Australian case study. Public Health Res Pract. 2023; Online early publication. https://doi.org/10.17061/phrp33122305

[2] Freeman B, Watts C, We worked out how many tobacco lobbyists end up in government, and vice versa. It's a lot, published May 11, 2023, accessed May 12, 2023.